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"A DEATH HE FREELY ACCEPTED":
MOLINIST REFLECTIONS ON THE INCARNATION
Thomas P. Flint

Traditional Christians face a puzzle concerning the freedom and perfection of
Christ. Jesus the man, it seems, must have possessed significant freedom for
him to serve as a moral example for us and for his death to have been truly meritorious. Yet Jesus the Son of God must be incapable of sinning if he is truly
divine. So if Jesus is both human and divine, one of these two attributes - significant freedom or moral perfection - apparently needs to be surrendered. In this
essay, it is argued that if (and perhaps only if) a Molinist approach to divine
providence is embraced, one can plausibly affirm both the freedom of the man
and the impeccability of the Son.

The Second Eucharistie Prayer employed in the liturgy of the Roman
Catholic Church includes a passage which raises a thomy but fascinating
Christologieal puzzle. Describing the actions of Jesus at the Last Supper,
this passage, addressed to God the Father, reads:
Before he was given up to death, a death he freely accepted, he took
bread and gave you thanks.
The Christologically curious part of the passage comes in that initial
appositive - "a death he freely accepted." What are we to make of this
phrase? It seems to be saying that Jesus the man - the very one who took
bread into his hands - was free to reject death on a cross. Now, on the one
hand, such a clain1 makes sense. After all, how meritorious could his death
have been if Jesus had no say in accepting it, if he was not freely offering
up his life for us? And yet, on the other hand, is it really tenable to hold
that Jesus could have refused death on a cross? Didn't his Father clearly
will that he accept such a death? In failing to abide by his Father's will, a
will of which he was fully aware, would not Jesus have been acting sinfully? But how can Jesus act sinfully if he is truly divine?
The general problem toward which this specific example points is as
simple to state as it is resistant to simple resolutions. 1 Shouldn't we think
that Jesus the man was free in a morally significant way? And shouldn't
we think that Jesus the Son of God was incapable of sinning, and hence not
free in a n10rally significant way? But if Jesus is, as orthodoxy requires,
both truly human and truly divine, then which is to be sacrificed - the significant freedom that accompanies humanity, or the moral impeccability
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that accompanies divinity?
Many contemporary philosophers and theologians have shown little
reluctance to make one or the other sacrifice. 2 Now, if need be, I think we
could follow their lead. 3 But I can't see how, in my own case at least, it
could be anything other than a grudging surrender of one or the other
attribute (freedom or impeccability). What we would really like, I should
think, is a plausible way of holding on to both, or at least a tenable means
of not flatly rejecting either.
Of course, in philosophy as in life in general, we often can't get what
we'd really like, and hence need to muddle through as best we can. Those
of us from northem climes are often quite adept at stiffening our upper lips
and dourly making do. But I suspect that this is one of those happy cases
where we needn't just make do. If we are willing to follow the lead of a
certain Medieval Mediterranean master, we can attain a much more felicitous resolution of our dilemma.
The medieval I have in mind in Luis de Molina, whose picture of divine
providence has enjoyed something of a revival in recent years. According
to Molina, God can exercise providence t~anks to his middle knowledgehis knowledge of contingent truths over which he has no contro!. Of greatest interest among the contents of his middle knowledge are counterfactuals of creaturely freedom, conditionals that, loosely speaking, afford him
knowledge of how any creature who does or might have existed would
freely act in any situation in which that person might have been created
and left free. 4 By examining these counterfactuals and carefully selecting
the situations in which his free creatures are placed, God is able to arrange
things so that his ends are achieved with certainty even though the freedom of his creatures is maintained.
This thumbnail sketch of the Molinist account gives one only a faint
image of what is widely agreed, by proponents and detractors alike, to be a
fascinating and intricate attempt to understand God's relationship to his
world. For our purposes, though, this faint image should suffice. Of
course, this picture of providence has been hotly debated in recent years.
My own view, to put it succinctly, is that the Molinist account is the
inevitable offspring of two theses to which orthodox Christians are quite
properly strongly attracted. These two theses are (1) that God is provident
in the strong traditional sense, a sense which entails his foreknowledge of
and sovereignty over each and every event that occurs, and (2) that
humans are free in the full-blooded libertarian sense. As I see it, orthodox
Christians have solid prima facie reasons for accepting each of these two
theses, and hence have solid prima facie reasons for embracing Molinism.
The burden of proof, then, is on the opponents of Molinism to find lethai
objections to this means of understanding providence. Thus far, it seems to
me, it is a bLlrden that the detractors of Molinism have failed to carry: the
arguments against middle knowledge are a far cry from offering the compelling reasons that a Christian should demand from those asking th.at she
renounce the Molinist position. Hence, the most reasonable position for a
Christian is to embrace the picture of providence that middle knowledge
makes possible. 5
This view of the dialectical situation, one that land others have defend-
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ed extensively elsewhere, is extremely controversial. But that controversy
is not my topic in this essay. What I shall endeavor to do here is perhaps
best thought of as arguing for the conditional claim that if the overall
Molinist picture of providence is correct, then accepting the doctrine of the
Incarnation doesn't force us to make the hard choice between freedom and
perfeetion outlined above. After outlining aversion of our Christological
puzzle more carefully in the next section, I will show how Molinism seems
to offer a uniquely appealing solution, a solution which I will then briefly
defend against three objections.
I

The orthodox Christian doctrine concerning the Incarnation is that Jesus
Christ is both truly and fully divine and truly and fully human. More precisely, the second person of the Trinity, though eternally possessing the
divine nature, took on at a certain point in time a human nature. What
exactly was assumed by the Son when he became incarnate depends upon
what exactly human beings are; but whatever we human individuals are bodies, souls, body-soul composites, or something else - that is what the
Son assumed. In keeping with. much of the tradition in these discussions, I
will speak of the Son as assuming an individual human nature, and will
(again, largely in deference to tradition) presume that individual human
natures are body-soul composites, though nothing of importance will
hinge on this supposition. 6
The doctrine of the Incarnation implies that the individual human
nature assun1ed by the Son has a rather unusual ontological status.? Most
of us just are individual human natures, so that whatever can be said of my
individual human nature can equally be said of the person I am. To once
agau1 employ traditionallanguage, most individual human natures just are
supposita, or ultimate subjects of predication. In the case of the Incarnation,
though, the individual human nature assumed by the Son cannot be
thought of as a separate person from the Son, for that would involve us in
Nestorianism. Rather, in this unique case, what we must say is that this
individual human nature, this particular body-soul composite (or whatever), is not a suppositum; the ultimate subject of any of its properties is not
it, but rather the Son, the person who is united to and sustains in being this
individual human nature. Aquinas and others imply at times that a mereological model of the Incarl1ation can prove helpful, a model according to
which the individual human nature is seen as analogous to apart, with the
Son as the whole of which it is apart; just as many of a part's properties are
most properly predicated of the whole, so the characteristics of the individual human nature are ultimately characteristics of the Son. 8
It is hard to find an elegant way to name the individual human nature
that the Son assumed, a way which will allow us to say what Christians
have traditionally wanted to say. For example, we could legislate that the
word "Jesus" is to be used to refer only to the human nature of the Son;
but, since the hun1an nature is not itself aperson, and is not identical to the
Son, this would force us to say that Jesus is not aperson, and that Jesus is
not the Son of God. Needless to say, few Christians would feel comfort-
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able making such assertions. Similar problems, I think, arise for other
obvious candidates here - "Christ", "the Son of Man", "the Lamb of God"
and the like. With considerable reluctance, I have decided, for the sake of
clarity, to abandon any pretense of elegance. Thus, I will label Christ's
human nature as CHN. So CHN refers to the particular body-soul con1posite that was and is supematurally united to the second person of the
Trinity.
CHN, then, was born of the Virgin Mary, walked along the Sea of
Galilee, performed various miraculous eures, accepted death on a cross,
and so on. In saying trus, of course, we are not saying that CHN was the
person who did or endured all these things. For CHN is not a person at all;
the person who did these things was the Son. Still, since the Son did these
things via the created intellect, will, and body of CHN, and since that intellect, will and body were mysteriously united to t11e Son in such a fashion
that the Son subsisted in that nature lias in one made his very own by the
Incamation,"9 it is entirely appropriate to see CHN as the proximate, and
the Son as the ultimate, possessor of the properties involved - much as,
for example, my hand might be the proximate, and me the ultimate, possessor of the property of touching an iguana.
So CHN did many things dllring its time on earth. 10 Did CHN also do
some things freely? More specifically, did CHN perform some actions in
situations that left it free, but where failure to act as it did would have been
sinful?l1 Here we encounter the puzzle with which we began this essay.12
On the one hand, it seems that we must say that CHN couldn't have
sinned. For what CHN does, the Son does, and the Son, being essentially
divine and hence essentially morally perfeet, cannot sin. On the other
hand, to say that CHN was not free to sin seems to din1inish if not to eradicate the meritorious nature of CHN's redeeming activity. How can we say
that CHN freely accepted death on a cross if the option to reject the
Father's will- the option that surely appears to be genuinely open during
the agony in the Garden of Gethsemani - was not in fact open to CHN?
Similarly, how can we find the life of Christ as a model for our own if we
say that, llnlike us, CHN lacked significant n10ral freedom? The author of
Hebrews (4:15) says that " we do not have a high priest who is unable to
sympathize with our weaknesses, but we have one who in every respect
has been tested as we are, yet without sin"; how can we say this (and n1ean
it) if we think of CHN, not merely as sinless, but as incapable of sinning?
Various atten1pts at solving this puzzle might appeal to those who are
willing to modify or abandon either Molinism or the traditional doctrine of
the Incarnation. 13 For example, some would insist that neither CHN nor
the Son is essentially morally perfeet. Perhaps God took a risk by becon1ing incarnate; perhaps what he risked was the loss of his own moral perfeetion, a loss l1e would in fact have suffered had CHN sinned. Other, more
risk-averse theorists might simply reject the claim that it was important
that CHN possess significant moral freedom; perhaps, they might say, the
appearance to CHN that it was free was all that was needed. Still others
might insist that it is our libertarian assumptions that are causing the problem; jettison these assumptions, grant that CHN's will could remain free
even if its deliverances were causally determined by God, and our puzzle
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dissolves. I will not pause to consider these approaches in detail, but will
simply register my belief that no traditional Christian should feel comfortable embracing any of them.
Suppose, then, that these non-Molinist alternatives fail. Does Molinism
have anything better to offer? Molina, at least, thought that it does. By
embracing the theory of middle knowledge, he implies, we can solve our
puzzle in such a way that the essential impeccability of the Son is maintained, the freedom of CHN to sin is ensured, and the full-blooded libertarian picture of freedom is retained.
11
In Part 4 of Disputation 53 of the Concordia, Molina responds to eight objections to his views that had been raised by Francisco Zumel. In the last of
these objections, Zumel argues that God must have determined Christ's
free actions,

especially that act by which he fulfilled the Father's command concerning the redemption of the human race by his own death. For
Christ, since he was at the same time God, was in no way able to sin,
and hence was not able not to elicit the act by which he was to fulfill
that command. And yet he elicited that act freely; otherwise, he
would not have merited anything by it, and, consequently, he would
not have redeemed the human race by it - which is heretical. 14
Since Christ acted freely yet couldn't sin, Zumel contends, Molina's libertarian leanings need to be replaced with a recognition that divine determination of an act is fully compatible with that aces being free.
In his response to this objection - the longest by far of his responses to
Zumel - Molina begins by noting "that what is owed to the human nature
assun1ed by the Word by reason of the assumption or grace of union is far
different from what belongs to it because of the mere assumption, excluding all the other gifts that are owed to it by reason of the grace of union." 15
In other words, some characteristics are such that it is logically necessary
that they be present in an assumed human nature; others, though not necessary, are "owed" to the human nature, in the sense that it would be
extraordinary if they were not present. Among these later characteristics
are those that Molina refers to as the glory of the soul and the glory of the
body. Each of these is a natural effect of the beatific vision which, according to tradition, CHN always enjoyed. The glory of the soul, which graciously bestows a clear vision of the truth and an uncorrupted will on its
recipient, renders one unable to do evil; the glory of the body consists in
possession of the kind of perfected human body we see Jesus possessing
after the Resurrection. Though it might have been expected that God
would bestow both the glory of the soul and the glory of the body on CHN
from the moment of its conception, there was no necessity to his doing so;
should he have a good reason, he could miraculously withhold these gifts.
And as Molina saw it, he did indeed have a good reason:
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even though by reason of the grace of union all those things were
owed to Christ or to his humanity that he had after the Resurrection,
nonetheless, since (i) the Incarnation was by the same token arranged
by God in order that Christ might by his merits and death redeem the
human race, and in order that by his most holy and perfect life he
might furnish mortals with an especially shining example, an exampIe by which they would be instructed in every kind of virtue and
perfection, and by which they would be strongly stimulated and
impelled toward imitating hirn, and since (ii) it was more glorious for
Christ to gain the glory and exaltation of the body by his own proper
n1erits than for hirn to have had this glory immediately from the very
beginning, it follows that ... he did not receive th.e glory of the body
until the Resurrection. Nor was it just this bodily glory that God
miraculously prevented from arising out of the glory of the soul; but
at the same time the vision of the divine essence, along with the
beatific love and enjoyment, was also communicated by God to the
human nature in. such a way that by preventing (in a manner surpassing the nature of these goods) the effects that ought to have
resulted from them by a necessity of nature, He left Christ's will susceptible to anguish and sadness and hence free to fulfill or not to fulfill the precepts that bound hirn under pain of guilt - just as if the
glory of t11e soul had not existed in Christ. 16

According to Molina, then, God saw to it that CHN, though receiving a
multitude of gifts from the Father, did not receive those gifts that would
have rendered it incapable of sinning. Rather, in order that CHN's actions
might prove truly meritorious, the Father saw to it that CHN was placed in
what we might call jreedom-retaining circumstances - circumstances in which
the full natural effects of the beatific vision were blocked so as to retain
CHN's freedom "not to do those things that he was obligated by precept to
dO." 17 So Molina clearly provides a picture according to which CHN is significantly free in the fulllibertarian sense.
By t11us championing the freedom of CHN, though, have we not abandoned the traditional belief that an incarl1ate God could not sin? Molina
thinks not. T110ugh his argument here is not as con1plete as one might like,
the lacunae are fairly easy to fill in. The cruciallines, I think, are tl1e following:
... it involves a contradiction for Christ to sin, not because Christ as a
wayfarer [i.e., CHN] lacks the ability to transgress commands, but
rather because it is impossible for God to permit it, and because it is
incompatible with the infinite goodness of the divine Word that he
should sin, even through his assumed nature, and thus that God
should permit it. Therefore, it pertained to divine providence to
arrange things in such a way that while Christ's freedom was preserved, a freedom required for merit and for the pllrposes explained
above, he would in no way sin; and this is in fact what happened. 18
Molina is explicit, then, in maintaining (in effect) that there is no possible
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world in which an assumed human nature sins. So, given that CHN is
assumed, it follows with certainty that CHN does not sin. Still, CHN is
able to sin. That is to say, CHN has access to worlds in which CHN sins.
What folIows, it seems clear, is that CHN has access to worlds in wl1ich
CHN is not assumed. That is to say, CHN has the power so to act that
CHN l1ever would have been assumed had it so acted. Given that CHN
was assumed, then, what follows is that God must have arranged things in
such a way that, though CHN could have sinned given that arrangement
of freedom-retaining circumstances, it in fact did not. Nor could God's
having arranged things in this way just be a happy coincidence, a bit of
good luck for a Father keeping his fingers crossed that CHN would remain
sinless. Molina clearly thinks it, not just false, but impossible that both
CHN be assumed and CHN sin in the circumstances in which the Father
allows it to be placed. But the only way God COllld have had certau1ty concerning CHN's remaining sinless would be if he had middle knowledge
that CHN would freely remain sinless if placed in certain freedom-retaining circumstances. Given this middle knowledge, he could then decide
both to assume CHN and to see to it that CHN is placed only in circumstances in which God knew it would in fact freely refrain from sinning. So
Molina's solution to our puzzle about t11e Incamation depends upon both
God's knowing counterfactuals of creaturely freedom about CHN and his
utilizing that knowledge in determining the situations U1 which to place
CHN.
Perhaps an example will help here. Suppose God saw, prior to his decision as to which creatures to create in which circumstances, that each of the
following counterfactuals was true:
(1)

If CHN were placed in freedom-retaining circumstances C,

CHN would freely sin.
(2)

If CHN were placed in freedom-retaining circumstances C*,
CHN would freely refrain from sinning.

Given his knowledge of (1), God would know that, should he assume
CHN, he could not place CHN in C, for to do so would lead to the incarnate Son's sinning, astate of affairs which, to quote Molina again, "it is
impossible for God to permit." On the ot11er hand, he would also know on
the basis of (2) that, other things being equal, he could if he so chose
assume CHN and place CHN in C*. Of COllrse, ot11er things might not be
equal. Perhaps C* is not astate of affairs that it is feasible for God to actualize - that is, perhaps it involves some free creature's performing a certain
free action that, as a matter of fact, it would not perform no matter what
God might dO. 19 Or perhaps C* represents only a momentary set of circumstances. Perhaps C* needs to be complemented by other circumstances to
give us the totality of circumstances in whicl1 CHN is placed over the
COllrse of its life. And perhaps, no matter how C* were thus enriched, the
fact is that CHN would at some point or other sin if placed in those
enriched circumstances - assuming, of course, that the circumstances
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themselves do not include CI-IN's being assumed. So the fact that (2) is
true does not entail either that the Son might assurne CHN or that the Son
might assurne CHN and place it in C*. But suppose that the other counterfactuals of creaturely freedom were more amenable. Suppose they dovetailed with (2) so as to provide God with knowledge of certain contingent
counterfactuals with suitably enriched feasible antecedents (antecedents
specifying what we might call lifelong circumstances) - counterfactuals
such as
(3)

If CHN were placed in lifelong freedom-retaining circumstances 0, CHN would freely refrain from sinning. 20

Then God would know that he could indeed assurne CHN and place CHN
in O. CHN would indeed be free to sin in 0, but given his certainty of (3),
God would also be certain that CHN would not in fact sil1.. Hence, both
the freedom of the assumed human nature and the impeccability of the
person assuming that nature would be assured.
Let us say that an individual human nature is assumable just in case, for
some lifelong freedom-retaining circumstances, that nature would freely
refrain from sinning if placed in those circumstances. 21 Let us also call a
counterfactual of this sort a counterfactual of assumability. (3), then, is a
counterfactual of assumability; and what it tells God is that CHN is assumable.
Molina's solution to our puzzle thus seems complete. Given that God
h.as middle knowledge, it appears that the freedom of CHN to sin, freedom in the true-blue libertarian sense, is fully compatible with the impossibility of the Son's sinning. Death on a cross, then, truly was "a death he
freely accepted", even though the Son could not have ignored his Father's
will by refusing that sacrificial and atoning act.
111

There are many ways in which. this Molinist solution to our puzzle
might be called into question. Here, I will limit myself to a very brief consideration of three such objections.
First, one might ask, who is the "he" referred to in "a death h.e freely
accepted"? The natural response, it would seem, is that Jesus is the "he" of
whom we are speaking here. But Jesus, according to orthodox Christian
belief, is none other than the Son. So we need to say that this was a death
that the Son freely accepted. But the Molinist SOlLltion does not allow us to
say this, for it denies that the Son was able to disobey his Father's will. All
it really warrants is the claim that CHN freely accepted this death. But
CHN is not the same as the Son. So the Molinist solution does not in fact
permit us to say what we need to say here.
The first thing to note about this objection is that it is less a criticism of
the Molil1.ist solution than it is an attack upon the traditional Christological
claims which that solution. seeks to defend. For what it implies is that th.e
traditional Christian has wanted to say both that the Son is able to sin and
that the San is not able to sin, and if such a criticism is correct, then the
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Christian view as traditionally expressed is straightforwardly inconsistent,
and there is not really a coherent picture for the Molinist or anyone else to
defend.
Though much might need to be said in order to offer a full response to
this objection, many would feel that it is sufficient to point out that,
though the Son is indeed the ultimate subject of the properties we ascribe
to CHN, he is sometimes that subject only in a remote or qualified sense.
Take, for example, the property of having been created. This is a property
that applies directly and immediately to CHN. Since the Son is the ultimate subject of CHN's properties, it follows that the Son is in some sense
the person in question who has this property of having been created. Yet
to say in a simple, non-qualified way th.at the Son was created is clearly to
flirt with heresy. What we need to say, then, is that the Son has the property of having been created only in some relative or qualified sel1se. Various
ways of speaking that highlight such qualifications are well known. For
example, rather than say "The Son was created", we might say "The Son
qua human was created," or "The Son with respect to his human nature
was created". In this way, the tradition has suggested, we can both uphold
the orthodox Christian position and avoid even the appearance of contradiction. And, of course, if such a move succeeds in the case of a property
such as having been created, it can also be employed in the case of freely
following the Father's will.
Though I think this response goes a long way toward resolving this first
problem, some might feel that it simply papers over a hole ll1 the traditional Christian view that should be more honestly acknowledged. Consider
again the mereological model of the Incarnation we have already mentioned, and the fact that sometimes properties of parts simply are not strictly speaking properties of their wholes - the property "is smaller than a
breadbox", when said of an elephant's eyelash, is an obvious example.
Consider, then, the property of "freely accepting death on a cross". Is this
not a property that is, strictly speaking, ascribable to CHN, but not to the
Son? Many would no doubt feel that the answer is clearly yes. The Son
does not freely accept death on a cross, any more than an elephal1t is smaller than a breadbox. No one would think we can get around this obvious
pachydermal fact by saying that the elephant qua eyelashed is smaller than
a breadbox; why think that saying that the Son qua human is free to sin
makes any more sense? To employ "qua" or "with respect to" language is
little more than a ploy designed to disguise the fact that, strictly speaking,
properties such as "freely accepted death" or "was created" simply cannot
be ascribed to the Son.
Again, a full resolutiOl1 of this matter would take us far beyond the confines of this paper. But the way in which this conflict is resolved, it seems
to me, is largely irrelevant to an evaluation of the Molinist solution to our
initial puzzle. For the question really is this: Does the fact that CHN is able
to sin allow us to say that the Son, though impeccable, is able in some qualified way to sin? If it does, then clearly our first objection is answered. If it
does not, then we seem to have little choice but to say that many properties
traditionally ascribed to the Son - properties such as "being human" or
"freely accepting death on a cross" - are strictly speaking properties only

12

Faith and Philosophy

of CHN; claims ascribing such properties to the Son would then have to be
viewed as literaIly false, th.ough we ll1ight weIl remain tolerant of their use
in liturgical and other contexts where a pedantic concern for philosophical
precision is often out of place. But however we think the traditional
Christian should end up answering our question, the Molinist endeavor to
defend both CHN's freedom and the Son's essential moral perfection will
remain as a seemingly viable solution to our puzzle. Therefore, I cannot
see this first objection as lethai to the Molinist stance.
Our second objection, unlike the first, takes aim squarely at the Molinist
dimension to our solution. We have suggested that the freedom of CHN
and the ill1peccability of the Son can both be maintained if we assurne that
God's middle knowledge afforded hirn full cognizance of 110w CHN
would act in any lifelong freedom-retaining circumstances. But middle
knowledge, the objector might point out, is usually thought of as knowledge of how free persons would act. And this poses a problem because,
according to the Molinist (and to aIl orthodox Christians), CHN is not a
person, but only a human nature assumed by a divine person. So how
could middle knowledge provide God with knowledge of how CHN
would act?
The way in which the Molinist needs to respond to this objection, I
think, is fairly clear. What she needs to say is that the counterfactuals of
creaturely freedoll1 that God knows via middle knowledge make reference
not to human persons, but to individual human natures. In most cases, of
course, this amounts to a distinction without a difference: most of us
humans just are individual human natures. But in the case of the
Incamation, the distinction is crucial. By stipulating that the counterfactuals of creaturely freedom refer to natures rather than persons, the Molinist
leaves unchanged God's knowledge of counterfactuals about us unassumed natures, but opens conceptual space for the Molinist solution to our
puzzle that we outlined in the previous section. Hence, though this shift
does constitute a slight change from the position Molinists have traditionally defended, the shift comes with no cost but great benefits. It is thus a
shift weIl worth making. 22
Our third objection questions two elements of the Molinist strategy we
have employed: the claim that God could have middle knowledge of the
relevant types of counterfactuals, and the assumption that CHN's freedom
has been maintained by such an approach. We suggested that CHN is
assumable just in case a counterfactual of assumability such as
(3)

If CHN were placed in lifelong freedom-retaining circumstances 0, CHN would freely refrain from sinning

is true. Implicit in this suggestion is the idea that God might choose 0
(rather than, say, 0*) as the circumstances in which to place and assurne
CHN because he knew other counterfactuals such as
(4)

If CHN were placed in lifelong freedom-retaining circumstances 0*, CHN would freely sin.
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But, OLlr imagined objector begins, to suggest that either of these conditionals could be part of middle knowledge is to ignore the fact that tl1eir
antecedents are radically incomplete, for they make no reference to
whether or not CHN is assumed. Molinists have typically insisted that the
counterfactuals on which God bases his creative decisions must have
antecedents that include at least all exercises of causal power prior to the
relevant time. 23 Since to assurne a human nature is clearly an exercise of
God's causal power, the antecedents of those conditionals that God knows
by middle knowledge must indicate whether or not a particular human
nature such as CHN is or isn't assumed by God. BLlt when we try to incorporate such information into the antecedents of (3) and (4), we quickly discover a problem. For consider
(3*) If CHN were placed in lifelong freedom-retaining circumstances D and assumed by God, CHN would freely refrain from
sinning.
and
(4*) If CHN were placed in lifelong freedom-retaining circumstances D* and assumed by God, CHN would sin.
(3) and (4) were supposed to be useful to God by informing hirn which circumstances to place CHN in if he wished to assurne that nature. But the
distinction between D and D* - the former a set of circumstances that contingently implies CHN's not sinning, the latter a set that contingently implies
its sinning - disappears once we consider (3*) and (4*). For how could
either of these conditionals be a contingent truth or falsehood? Recall
Molina's claim that it is impossible that God permit an assumed nature to

be placed in circumstances in which it sinS. 24 Doesn't this imply that it is
metaphysically necessary that, if a certain nature is assumed, the nature in
question does not sin? So doesn't (3*) turn out to be, not just true, but necessarily true? And doesn't similar reasoning show (4*) to be necessarily
false? But if so, how could either of these conditiol1als be part of middle
knowledge, given that such knowledge includes only contingent truths?
Finally, how could the actions described in the consequents of these conditionals be free in the libertarian sense? Take (3*). Suppose, letting A stand
for CHN's being assumed and ,...,5 stand for his not sinning, we represent
(3*) by the shorthand
(3*)

(A & D)

~

,...,5. 25

What we have seen is that being assumed is by itself logically sufficient for
CHN's not sinning. That is, A by itself entails ,...,5. So (3*) is true only
because
(3**) (A & D) ==> ,...,5. 26

But it seems fair to assurne that CHN has no choice about either D or A: D
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is the set of circumstances in which CHN makes choices, and A would
seem to be up to God, not up to CHN. So CHN's not silming is a logical
consequence of circumstances over which CHN has no control. But then,
how could its not sinning possibly count as free and meritorious behavior?
A full Molinist response to this objection would be a lengthy and complicated matter. Still, even without going into great detail, we can, I think,
see that the Molinist has good reason to deny both the claim that (a) counterfactuals such as (3) and (4) could be not be part of middle knowledge
because neither (3*) nor (4*) is contingent, and the allegation that (b) the
necessary status of conditionals such as (3*) threatens the freedom of the
assumed human nature. I shall address (a) and (b) in turn.
First, regarding (a), consider (3), the claim that D counterfactually
implies ~S. By enlarging (3)'s antecedent to include A, we do indeed get
with (3*) a proposition that cannot be considered part of middle knowledge. But this fact by itself does not preclude (3)'s being part of middle
knowledge. For consider what happens if we enlarge the antecedent of (3)
by asserting that CHN is not assumed. That is, consider
(3')

(~A

& D)

~ ~S.

If God has middle knowledge, then presumably a proposition such as (3')
could be part of it, for (3') has a complete antecedent that does not entail its
consequent. But if (3') is part of middle knowledge, then so is the conjunction
of (3') and (3*).27 This conjunction, however, entails (3). So if (3') is part of
rniddle knowledge, then so is (3).28 Therefore, the fact that (3*) is a necessary
truth fi no way disqualifies (3) from befig an element of middle knowledge.
With (4), things are slightly less clear. Still, there seems to be strong reason to think that conditionals of this form also could be part of middle
knowledge. For though (4*) is indeed necessarily false, the same does not
go for

Now (4'), like (3'), has a complete antecedent that does not entail eitlLer the
truth or the falsity of its consequent. So (4') could be part of God's middle
knowledge. Suppose it were. Could it also be the case that (4) - i.e., (D* ~
S) - was not part of middle knowledge? It's hard to see how this could be
so. For to think of (4') but not (4) as part of middle knowledge would be to
view assumption as a kind of divine trump card, an addition to the agent's
circumstances that on its own changes what the agent would do. The fact
that a human nature is assumed, we might well expect, would affect what
the agent does, but only insofar as it affects the circumstances in which the
agent is placed - the natural influences it encounters, the graces it receives,
and so forth. But all such factors are, in our example, included in D*. To
think that God, knowing that (4') was true, could simply tack on A to D*
and thereby effect CHN's sinlessness seems preposterous.
A slightly more formal way of arguing here might go as follows. For
the reasons offered in the last paragraph, the following principle seems
eminently plausible:
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Necessarily, if an individual human nature is assumed in freedom-retaining circumstances such that, had it been in those circun1stances but not been assumed, it would have freely done X,
then the individual human nature freely does X.

Applying (P) to our example, we know that
(5)

But
(6)

{A & D* & [(--A & D*)

~

5]} ==> 5.

(A & D*) ==> --5

is obviously true; in no possible world does an assumed nature sin.
Together, (5) and (6) entail
(7)

--O{A & D* & [(--A & D*)

~

5]},

which in turn entails
(8)

[(--A & D*)

~

5] ==> --(A & D*).

But God, we are assuming, has middle knowledge of (4'), the antecedent of
(8). So he also has middle knowledge of the consequent of (8).29 And this
means that God knows, prior to any free action on his part, that bringing
about (A & D*) was not an option open to hirn. That is, God knew by middIe knowledge that, should he decide to place CHN in D*, he could not
also assurne CHN - i.e., that
(9) (D*

~

--A).

But from this it follows that the conjunction of (9) and (4') both is part of
middle knowledge and entails (4). So (4) too would be part of middle
knowledge. 30
We have seen that (a), the contentiol1 that God could not have middle
knowledge of counterfactuals such as (3) and (4), seems to be on shaky
ground. But what of (b), the suggestion that truths such as
(3**) (A & D) ==> --5

point to CHN's lack of freedom in situations in which CHN is assumed?
This suggestion would have merit were it true that CHN had absolutely no
control over A and D. But the Molinist at least would see no reason to
assent to this lack of contro!. For CHN, the Molinist is assuming, was free
to sin. And were CHN to have sinned, CHN would not have been
assumed. So CHN had the power to do something such that, were CHN to
have done it, the antecedent of (3**) would not have been true. 31 And this
means that the truth of (3**) does not imply that CHN was tl1e prisoner of
(A & D).

Not surprisingly, the Molinist response to this objection based on (3**) is
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reminiscent of the typical Molinist response to the claim that divine foreknowledge is incompatible with human freedom. For no Molinist will
deny that propositions such as
(10) (God knows that Cuthbert will call Bert tomorrow) => (Cuthbert
will call Bert tomorrow)
are true. But their truth, the Molinist insists, gives us no reason to question
the reality of human freedom. For the fact (if it is a fact) that Cuthbert will
call Bert is compatible with the claim that Cuthbert is free not to call Bert;
and, of course, if Cuthbert were not to call Bert, God would not have foreknown that Cuthbert would call. Truths such as (10), then, do not threaten
human freedom because their antecedents are not fixed facts over which
the humans in question have no contro!. And what goes for (10), the
Molinist concludes, goes for (3**) as welp2
There are surely other objections that might be raised against our
Molinist solution. Still, I know of none that is stronger than the three we
have considered. Assuming, then, that the general objections to the overall
theory of middle knowledge have been met, we seem to have in Molinism
a powerful means of solving our Incarnational puzzle.
Indeed, I think that Molinism is unique in offering us a genuinely plausible solution. For consider how the two principal alternatives to Molinism
could address the problem. Thomism is the general name I have borrowed
for the picture of providence which results from combining the strong traditional notion of God's providence with a non-libertarian picture of freedom.3J Thomists such as Zumel clearly have a solution to our puzzle readily available: CHN was free, but free in a sense compatible with direct
determination of its actions by the Son's divine nature. While such a solution seems within the pale theologically, the ideas of freedom and of divine
determination on which it is based are so implausible and lead to such
severe problems, especially with regard to the problem of evil, that it surely must be deemed dramatically inferior to the Molinist approach we have
advanced. 34
The same verdict holds for the third general account of providence
available, that offered by advocates of the "openness" of God. Openists
concur with Molinists in affirming the libertarian picture of freedom, but
reject the traditional notion of providence that Molinists and Thomists
share. God, openists insist, has no knowledge of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom, and no universal knowledge of or genuine, specific control
over the future. Though their view of freedom avoids the problems with
evil which bedevil the Thomists, openists seem to have no way to maintain
both the freedom of CHN and the essential impeccability of the Son. For if
CHN is significantly free but God lacks middle knowledge, then God's
interactions with CHN are based on his knowledge of how CHN (even the
assumed CHN) would probably act in various different situations. But this
means that God, even if he places CHN in the most favorable freedomretaining circumstances, is taking real risks with CHN: he's betting that
CHN won't in fact perform those sinful actions that he knew he probably
wouldn't perform. And, of course, it's entirely possible that God lose some
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of those bets. So the openists, it seems, must say either that CHN flatly
lacks significant moral freedom or that there are possible worlds in which
CHN is both assumed by the Son and sins. Neither of these alternatives, it
seems clear to me, is nearly so attractive as that offered us by Molinism.

IV
My conclusion is easy to state. If Molinism is endorsed, then one apparently has a viable means of reconciling the freedom of Jesus the man with
the essential moral perfection of Jesus the Son of God. If Molinism is rejected, no such avenue of reconciliation is in view. 35

University ofNotre Dame
NOTES
1. Note also that the general problem would remain even if one disagreed
with my appraisal of the specific case discussed in the preceding paragraph e.g., if one feIt that Jesus would have had no obligation to abide by the Father's
will that he accept death on a cross. I must confess that I find it hard to believe
that the man in the Garden of Gethsemani would have been doing nothing
wrong by frustrating the divine plan to bring salvation to mankind through his
voluntary acceptance of death. Hence, I have no difficulty accepting the
assumption (which, as we shall see, was shared by Molina and his opponents)
that Jesus's refusal to align his will with the Father's would in this case have
been morally wrong. For those who do find this assumption difficult, though,
the problen1 under discussion still arises so long as they grant that Jesus at
some point in his life was free with respect to so me morally significant choice.
Those who refuse to grant even this are absolved from needing to think further
on this topic, though they might want to reconsider their reasons for adopting
a view that many will think needlessly diminishes the human nature of the
Incarnate.
2. Let me mention two prominent philosophical examples. Thomas V.
Morris, when discussing whether it makes sense to think of an incarnate God
being tempted, explicitly denies that Jesus the man could have done evil.
Morris tries to reconcile this denial with an affirmation of a type of freedom for
Jesus, but it clearly is not the full-blooded libertarian notion of freedom that he
generally champions. See his The Logic of God Incarnate (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1986), pp. 150-153. On the other side, Nelson Pike has
famously argued that the essential moral impeccability of God needs to be
denied if his omnipotence and moral praiseworthiness are to be upheld. See
his "Omnipotence and God's Ability to Sin," American Philosophical Quarterly 6
(1969), pp 208-216.
3. More precisely, I think we could follow the lead of those who deny
Jesus the man any sense of significant freedom. To surrender moral perfection
as part of the divine nature seems to me a dead end for orthodox Christians.
4. Strictly speaking, the conditionals in question cannot be about the creatures themselves. Since they need to guide God in his creative decisions, the
counterfactuals of creaturely freedom need to be true or false logically prior to
its being determined that the relevant creature will even exist. So some of the
conditionals will surely be about "possible but non-actual beings." Since most
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Molinists have agreed that there are (again, strictly speaking) no possible-butnot-actual beings, they have generally seen counterfactuals of creaturely freedom as referring to creaturely essences rather than to the creatures themselves.
For more on this issue, see my Divine Providence: The Molinist Account (Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), especially pp. 46-50. As will be seen
below, though, the Molinist might want to make a further slight emendation to
this account; see note 22.
5. The position outlined in this paragraph is presented at length in the
first two parts of my Divine Providence: The Molinist Account.
6. I maintain the tradition here at the risk of confusing those contemporary readers who view a nature as a kind of property. Clearly, the kind of
natures I am speaking of here are concrete particulars, not abstract entities.
Readers bothered by my usage of the term may be comforted by Aquinas's apt
Aristotelian aphorism, "nature is a word used in n1any ways" (Summa Contra
Gentiles, Bk. IV, Ch. 41, Sect. 2).
7. The picture of the Incamation offered in this paragraph is, as I understand it, that traditionally offered at least by Catholic theologians. Many contemporary theorists would reject this picture, suggesting instead, e.g., that the
Incamation did not involve the Son's assuming a distinct, created human soul,
but only his acquiring certain properties (such as being related to a human
body in a certain way) that entailed his becoming human. (For one prominent
exan1ple of such an alternative picture, see Richard Swinburne, The Christian
God (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), Ch. 9, especially pp. 212-215.) Though I
cannot here defend what I see as the more traditional view, I should at least
register my conviction that the alternatives of which I am aware seem noticeably inferior with respect to allowing us to avoid heresies such as
Appolinarianism and monothelitism.
8. For an enlightening discussion of the mereological model, along with
references to Aquinas, see Alfred J. Freddoso, "Logic, Ontology and Ockham's
Christology," New Scholasticism 57 (1983), pp. 293-330, especially pp. 305-312. It
should be noted that, as Jeffrey Brower has pointed out to me, Aquinas did not
rely solely upon this model in his endeavors to explicate the doctrine of the
Incarnation. For example, in Summa Contra Gentiles (IV, 41, 10-13), he emphasizes an instrun1ental rather than a mereological model. Christ's human
nature, he suggests, is the instrument of the Word in much the same way that
the human body is the instrument (or organ) of the human soul. For an influential earlier presentation of this analogy, see Augustine, Letters, Vol. 111 (New
York: Fathers of the Church, 1953), pp. 23-28.
9. Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, IV, 41, 7.
10. Some might object to the implication that CHN is an agent; what is not
aperson, they might say, cannot be an agent. Though I have some sympathy
with this objection, and though I wonder whether the issue here might not be
more terminological than substantial, it would seem peculiar to deny that
CHN did things. If a particular human mind and human will together form a
volition to write in the sand, and if the body to which they are united makes
the commanded bodily n10tions, does it not just follow that this particular
body-soul composite is doing something - namely, writing in the sand?
Subsequent discoveries concerning the assumption of this body-soul composite by a divine person might lead us to view the assun1ing person as the ultimate possessor of the property of writing in the sand, but I see no reason to
think that such discoveries should lead us to call into question our initial judgment that the body-soul composite was at least the proximate possessor of that
property.
11. Should pronouns referring to CHN be masculine or neuter? Though
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reasonable arguments in either direction could be made, I have chosen the latter alternative, largely because the use of "he" might be seen as giving aid and
comfort to Nestorianism.
12. 1t is perhaps worth noting what should be obvious - that this puzzle is
hardly a novel one. Freddoso refers to it as "one of the thorniest problems of
traditional Christology"; see his translation of Luis de Molina, On Divine
Foreknowledge: Part IV of the Concordia (lthaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
1988), p. 273, fn. 36. (Further references to this work will refer to it simply as
Molina, Concordia.) See also note 13 below.
13. The article by Walter Drum on "lncarnation" in The Catholic
Encyclopedia, Vol 7 (New York: Universal Knowledge Foundation, 1910) notes
on p. 715: "That Christ was free in the matter of death, is the teaching of all
Catholics; else He did not merit nor satisfy for us by I-1is death. Just how to
reconcile this liberty of Christ with the impossibility of His comn1itting sin has
ever been a crux for theologians.. Some seventeen explanations are given."
Unfortunately, the article fails to layout all seventeen!
14. Molina, Concordia, Disputation 53, Part 4, Section 17 (p. 265). Molina
here is quoting from Zumel's In Primam Divae Thomae Partem Commentaria.
15. Ibid., Disp. 53, Pt. 4, Sec. 19 (p. 266).
16. Ibid., Disp. 53, Pt. 4, Sec. 22 (p. 269).
17. Ibid., Disp. 53, Pt. 4, Sec. 23 (p. 271).
18. Ibid., Disp. 53, Pt. 4, Sec. 23 (p. 270).
19. For more on the notion of feasibility, see my Divine Providence, especially pp. 51-54.
20. For counterfactuals such as (3) to be contingent, and thus part of God's
middle knowledge, they clearly need to be thought of as having antecedents
that do not themselves entail CHN's being assumed. For further discussion of
this point, see the third objection discussed below in Section 11I.
21. I assume that a nature freely refrains from sinning only if the circumstances in which it is placed leave it genuinely free to sin. Hence, I am assuming that a nature in lifelong freedom-retaining circumstances faces morally significant choices.
22. For the reasons given in note 4, the Molinist should probably say that,
strictly speaking, counterfactuals of creaturely freedom make reference, not to
individual human natures (which exist only contingently and only logically
posterior to God's creative decision), but to the essences of such natures (where
such essences are seen as necessarily existing beings).
23. Though this is a claim Molinists have generally endorsed, they probably ought not to have done so. See my "A New Anti-Anti-Molinist
Argument," Religious Studies 35 (1999), pp. 299-305.
24. Actually, talk of permission here may be misleading, since it might be
thought to imply that, in some possible world, there are circumstances in which
an assumed nature sins. 1t seems clear that Molina would deny that there are
any such worlds.
25. I use "~" to represent counterfactual implication.
26. I use "~" to represent entailment - i.e., strict implication. Hence, (A ~
B) means that A entails B - i.e., that -O(A & -B).
27. The justification for this claim is not the general thesis that middle
knowledge is closed under entailment, for that general thesis is false. Any necessary truth is entailed by any element of middle knowledge; but necessary
truths are part of God's natural, not his middle, knowledge. (For more on the
distinction between natural and middle knowledge, see my Divine Providence,
pp. 38-42.) Middle knowledge, though, is closed under contingent entailment.
That is, if X is part of middle knowledge, and X entails Y, and Y is a contingent
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truth, then Y is part of middle knowledge. It is this truth that justifies the move
I make here. For (3') clearly entails the conjunction of (3') and (3*), and since
(3') itself is contingent, so is that conjunction.
28. For the reasoning that justifies this conditional, see note 27.
29. See note 27.
30. See note 27.
31. Note that the power being ascribed to CHN here is apower that the
assumed CHN has, not sin1ply apower that CHN would have had had it not been
assumed.
32. Some n1ight argue that the two cases are not parallel. Divine foreknowledge, they might say, does not make Cuthbert do anything, but divine
assumption of a human nature does make that nature necessarily impeccable.
Such an objection, though, simply trades on the ambiguity of "make". If we
take "make" in the sense of "logically guarantee", then being assumed does
make one impeccable. But, of course, in this sense of "make", foreknowledge
too makes one act in a certain way. For example, God's foreknowing that
Cuthbert will call Bert logically guarantees Cuthbert's making the call. On the
other hand, if we take"make" in the sense of "causally guarantee", then there's
no reason to think God's foreknowledge makes Cuthbert do anything. But, by
the same token, there's no reason to think that being assumed n1akes one do
anything either - at least, not so long as Molina is correct in claiming that an
assumed nature might not receive all the gifts it is "owed".
33. The name, though widely used, is a bit misleading, since not all followers of Aquinas see themselves as advocating this account of divine providence.
34. For more on the infelicities associated with the Thomist view of providence, see my Divine Providence, pp. 84-94.
35. Earlier versions of a longer essay that included an ancestor of this paper
were presented to the Center for Philosophy of Religion Discussion Group at
the University of Notre Dame and at the Society of Christian Philosophers session at the APA Eastem Division Meetings in December, 1998. I am grateful to
the n1embers of the Center for their help with the paper, and to David Hunt,
William Craig, William Hasker, Hugh McCann, and two anonymous Faith and
Philosophy referees for stimulating and challenging comments and questions.

